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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Constitution's Declaration of Rights, section 1, which
reads "all men are equal before the law . . . ," is the source of Florida's
equal protection inhibition.' This clause, of course, does not bar all legis-
lative classifications for few, if any, laws apply to all persons in the same
manner. "Equal protection demands only reasonable conformity in deal-
ing with parties similarly circumstanced, ' 2 and basically the requirement
for a legislative classification is that it be reasonable.' There must, under
our Florida Charter, be "some just relation to, or reasonable basis in,
essential difference of conditions and circumstances with reference to the
subject regulated, and [the statute] should not merely be arbitrary ... ."
In addition, a class should include all those similarly situated, unless there
are practical differences sufficient to warrant a special classification. 5
In applying these standards the court has two choices. It can adhere
to a strong presumption of legislative validity, upholding any classification
for which the legislature believed it had valid reasons. On the other hand,
the court can substitute its own discretion, requiring that there not only
be some reasonable basis for a particular classification, but that the classi-
fication be reasonable to the court. Under this second approach the extent
of judicial legislation is limited only by judicial discretion. It will be seen
that, while paying lip service to the first of these approaches, 6 which neces-
* Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review
1. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-up Bottling Co., 175 So.2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1965), quot-
ing from Davis v. Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759 (1913).
The inhibition that no state shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction of
the equal protection of the laws was designed to prevent any person, or class of per-
sons, from being singled out as a special subject for arbitrary and unjust discrimina-
tion and hostile legislation.
2. Hunter v. Flowers, 42 So.2d 435, 437 (Fla. 1949).
3. Rodriguez v. Jones, 64 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1953). But when both due process and equal
protection are argued, the court frequently fails to distinguish between the reasonableness of
the police power exercise and reasonableness of the classification of the statute. See Miami
v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d 798, 804 (Fla. 1957).
4. Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla. 1959).
5. See Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-up Bottling Co., supra note 1.
6. "The matter of the wisdom or good policy of a legislative act is a matter for the
legislature to determine." Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 159 Fla. 481, 483, 32 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla.
1947).
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sarily involves a strong adherence to the principle of separation of gov-
ernmental functions, the Florida Supreme Court often succumbs to the
temptation to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature.
Implicit in the court's judgment of reasonableness is a determination
of the strength of the state's police power (under substantive due process)
over the area sought to be regulated. Where that power has been strength-
ened by the court, the equal protection guaranty has been correspondingly
weakened.7 Consequently, it is often difficult to isolate these two concepts
(state power under the substantive due process and equal protection limi-
tations) in any one decision.
II. PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS
An excellent example of the Florida Supreme Court's approach to
legislative classification establishing professional requirements is Florida
Accountants Ass'n v. Dandelake.8 The statute in question restricted the
practice of public accounting to those persons holding certificates as
certified public accountants and to those persons who had been issued
certificates to practice public accounting prior to 1927. This classification
contained only seven hundred and fifty-one members. By broadly defining
public accountancy, the statute in effect required non-certified accountants
to entitle themselves "bookkeepers" rather than accountants, or in the
alternative, to be employed by those entitled to engage in public accoun-
tancy under the statute.
The court invalidated the statute, taking judicial notice of the small
number of persons included within the classification and the resulting
monopolistic conditions. The court judicially determined a field of profes-
sional operation within which no distinction could be made by the state
between certified and non-certified accountants. To prohibit non-certified
accountants from doing routine accounting work in their own offices,
rather than in that of an employer, would serve no purpose in the court's
view. Such an arbitrary regulation of non-certified accountants denied to
them the equal protection of the laws.
Another statutory classification required each applicant for a real
7. E.g., in a suit challanging the validity of FLA. STAT. § 454.031(3) which provides,
No person shall be entitled to admission to practice [law) without an examina-
tion . . . provided, that any person enrolled on or before the 25th day of July
1951, as a student in any law school . . . obtaining the degree of Bachelor of Laws
within three years . . . either of his enrollment or of the effective date of this
Act*. . . [shall be entitled to admission.... I
The court held the statute valid, despite a vigorous dissent maintaining that it was un-
reasonable, arbitrary and capricious to make enrollment date, rather than the date of
graduation, the cut-off. The majority believed that the classification was reasonable despite
the fact that it might work some hardship, in view of the fact that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege-another way of emphasizing the strong police power of the
legislature in this area. Fuller v. Watts, 74 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1954).
8. 98 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1957).
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estate broker's license, in counties with a population exceeding two
hundred sixty thousand (only Dade met this requirement), to demonstrate
that he had served an apprenticeship as a salesman under a registered
broker for at least one year.' The Florida Supreme Court reiterated ° its
view that such a regulation must be state-wide "unless some valid basis
for classification clearly appears." No such basis was found and the
statute was invalidated.
In 1927 the legislature authorized a state board to license naturo-
paths. A 1957 act abolished the board and forbade further licensing. The
presently licensed naturopaths who had practiced less than two years
could no longer practice naturopathy, while those who had practiced more
than two years but less than fifteen could renew their licenses to practice,
subject to the condition that they could no longer administer and prescribe
drugs. Those who had practiced more than fifteen years could continue
to administer and prescribe drugs. The plaintiff, a member of the second
class prohibited from administering and prescribing drugs, sought to
invalidate this statute because of the privileges granted those naturopaths
in practice more than fifteen years.
The court implied that a grandfather clause might have been valid,
but held that creation of a closed class within a closed class was unreason-
able since members of both classes "take the same training and pass the
same examination." Since the court was unable to approve any reasonable
basis for the granting of special privileges to those naturopaths who had
been practicing more than fifteen years, the classification was held un-
reasonable as a denial of equal protection of the law."
An example of a valid professional requirement was presented in
State v. Canova.12 The statute in question required that an applicant to be
a pharmacist had to be a graduate of an accredited four-year college of
pharmacy to be eligible for examination. However, the statute exempted
those pharmacists already licensed. 3 The plaintiff had graduated from a
two-year program and had practiced in another state since 1925. He
challenged this grandfather clause, asserting that it created an arbitrary
classification between those with similar academic training, a classification
depending upon whether or not the pharmacist was previously registered
in Florida. Here, at least, the court admitted that the "expediency or
wisdom of the standard of qualification fixed" was a matter for legislative
judgment and it declined to declare arbitrary the legislative theory that
those individuals already registered had demonstrated evidence of their
skill and competency equivalent to a four-year program of education.
9. State v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1956).
10. A similar statute was invalidated on equal protection grounds in Hollenbeck v.
State, 91 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1956).
11. Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1959).
12. 123 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1960).
13. FLA. STAT. § 465.071(1)(b) (1965).
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Recently the court considered a statute 4 which, for purposes of
regulation, classified farmers according to whether they sold cleaned and
packaged seed or uncleaned, unpackaged seed. The statute exempted
from its provisions the latter and required compliance from the former. A
further classification exempted, according to gross receipts, the small
seller. The court upheld the classification as having ".... a just, fair and
practical basis ... based on a real difference which is reasonably related
to the subject and purpose of the regulation."' 5 It was further noted that
such a classification was valid even though another classification, or no
classification, would have appeared more reasonable.
In Rabin v. Conner" the court considered portions of a celery
marketing order and a statute authorizing and awarding allotments on the
basis of production in prior years.' In the face of findings of fact by the
legislature that marketing of celery is affected with a public purpose and
that this particular exercise of its police power was for the purpose of
protecting the health, peace, safety and general welfare of the people of
the state, the court invalidated. The classification was one "for which we
can find no justification in any legitimate public policy .... ,1 Notice was
taken that the effect was to create a monopoly, denying others the right
to participate, in any reasonably large scale, in the marketing of celery. 9
An unjust and discriminatory distinction was drawn between those who
were producers during the representative period and those who were not.
Perhaps the most important invalidation in the past year occurred in
Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-up Bottling Co.'0 The court struck down
the comparative negligence statute for railroads, reasoning that a railroad
comparative negligence statute was reasonably confined to railroads only
if railroads were the single major dangerous instrumentality. The court
felt changing circumstances, such as the rise of the automobile and other
dangerous instrumentalities, had made it an arbitrary exercise of state
power to single out railroads for special liability. Since a statute can only
be reasonable with regard to the subject matter regulated, a substantial
change in the circumstances may make a once valid statute invalid. Un-
fortunately, the court failed to recognize a significant differentiating
factor between railroad companies and automobile owners-only the rail-
road company is a licensed public utility.
14. FLA. STAT. § 578.011 (1963).
15. Finlayson v. Conner, 167 So.2d 569, 571 (Fla. 1964).
16. 174 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1965).
17. FLA. STAT. ch. 573 (1963).
18. Supra note 16, at 725.
19. The court noted Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1963), in de-
termining the validity of legislation and orders of the kind involved here; the vital factor
to be considered is the practical effect and impact thereof.
20. 175 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
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III. SUNDAY LAWS
The area in which the Florida Supreme Court gives least effect to the
presumption of legislative validity is that of Sunday (or Blue) Laws. It
appears to be impossible for the legislature to enact a valid Sunday Law.
When presented with such a statute, the court invariably responds with
an invalidation.2' The federal experience, with a considerably more out-
rageous classification, goes another way.22
A Sunday Law of fairly general application was considered in 1957.2"
Florida Statutes sections 855.01 and 855.02 read:
855.01 Whoever follows any pursuit, business or trade on
Sunday . ..unless the same be a work of necessity, shall be
punished ... provided, however, that nothing contained in the
laws ... shall ... prohibit ... printing ... any newspaper...
nor shall [this section] apply to theaters in which moving pic-
tures are shown.
855.02 Whoever keeps open store.., on Sunday ... shall be
punished .... In cases of emergency or necessity, however, mer-
chants ... and others may dispose of the comforts and necessities
of life ... without keeping open doors.
The court invalidated although noting that"... the closing of all business
houses on Sunday ... bears a rational relationship to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. . . ," but "it does not follow that laws
containing the exemption of many businesses and vocations . ..can be
said to bear such relationship." The Justices failed to find a valid and
substantial reason for the legislative classification, i.e., the exemption from
operation of the law of newspapers, theaters and merchants under emer-
gency or necessity.
The legislature responded to this holding with a Sunday Law which
made it unlawful for any person or firm to engage in the business of buy-
ing, selling, trading or exchanging new or used cars, "on the first day of the
week, commonly called Sunday, or on legal holidays... ."" Cognizant of
the judicial aversion to Sunday Laws, the legislature provided, in the
preamble to the act, findings of fact to justify the selective exercise of the
state's police power. The court noted that even though legislative findings
of fact are presumed to be correct, they carry no presumption of correct-
ness if "obviously contrary to proven and firmly established truths of
which courts may take judicial notice." Since the court found the legisla-
tive findings of fact to be "obviously contrary" to fact, it was apparently
free to determine that there was no valid and substantial reason which
21. Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
22. E.g., Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
23. Kelly v. Blackburn, 95 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1957).
24. FLA. STAT. § 320.272(2) (1959).
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would allow the Legislature to regulate only this business, rather than all
businesses.
25
The outlook is less than bright for any Sunday Closing Law short of
an outright ban on all business activity which is probably a political im-
possibility. Any exceptions, regardless of the reasons advanced by the
Legislature, are tantamount to invalidation since the court considers the
only "reasonable" motivation behind such a law to be that of health-
providing a day of rest for all workers. Unless the court can be convinced
that there are some classes of workers who do not need the day of rest,
future Sunday Laws are doomed.
IV. TAXATION AND ASSESSMENT
In contrast to the weak presumption of legislative validity recognized
in Sunday Closing Law statutes, the court grants a vigorous presumption
under the state taxation power.2' This presumption extends to the power of
the legislature both to select subjects of taxation and to provide for
exemptions from taxation. However, excise or license taxes cannot be
unreasonable or arbitrary, either as to the basis of classification or the
amount of the tax imposed. 7 In addition, the "classifications are to be
compared not only in relation to each other but also in relation to the
amount of license fees imposed or not imposed."28 Obviously equal protec-
tion does not require that an excise tax be equal under all conditions.29
Omission of property from assessment rolls or assessment of property
at a lower rate than other property of the same class operates as a denial
of equal protection. ° Likewise a statute which allows a tax assessor to
systematically omit some property within a classification while including
other property is invalid."'
A major invalidation, delineating one of the limits on legislative dis-
cretion in tax matters, occurred in the case of Volusia County Kennel Club
v. Haggard.3 2 At issue was a tax on the dog racing operators' "take," based
on the amount of daily gross receipts, with a different rate imposed on
25. Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1960).
26. As examples, consider Gasson v. Gay, 49 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1950) and City of Orlando
v. National Gas & Appliance Co., 57 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1952). In the Gasson case the court
upheld the exemption of newspapers from a sales tax when newsmagazines were not given
a like exemption. In Orlando the court validated a statute which permitted municipalities to
tax natural gas and electricity while exempting fuel oil and kerosene, despite contentions
that common characteristics (as use for heating) made the classification arbitrary. In an ap-
proach unlike that under substantive due process the court answered that if this classification
must include fuel oil and kerosene one might as well say you must tax wood.
27. State v. Gerrell, 137 Fla. 324, 188 So. 812 (1939), quoted in State v. City of Pensa-
cola, 126 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1961).
28. Segal v. Simpson, 121 So.2d 790, 792 (Fla. 1960).
29. Heriot v. City of Pensacola, 146 So. 654, 108 Fla. 480 (1933).
30. Folsom v. Greenwood, 120 So. 317, 97 Fla. 433 (1929).
31. Cassady v. Consolidated Naval Stores Co., 119 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1960).
32. 73 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1954).
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each daily pool according to its amount. The court decided to
''eliminate . . . any theory that the tax is imposed under police power"
by rejecting any contention that the state has a greater police power over
legitimate gambling than over other businesses. Then, on rehearing, the
court reiterated its holding that "any attempted tax ... based solely on the
amount of the gross receipts of a business heretofore recognized by the
Legislature as being a legitimate business constituted a denial of the Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States and, the Declaration of Rights of the State of Floride."'3
It would probably be unwise to view the approach here taken as very
general in scope, since underlying this decision was the proximity of a tax
based closely on income to the constitutionally forbidden income tax. But
on its face, this decision would appear to bar a tax on any legal business
which could clearly distinguish income.
A decision invalidating a license tax, one undiluted by overtones of a
forbidden income tax, occurred in Segal v. Simpson. 4 At issue was a
statute3 5 levying a license fee of twenty-five dollars a day on commercial
establishments offering live entertainment and permitting consumption of
alcoholic beverages, and not holding a valid beverage license permitting
consumption on the premises. Noting that the fee imposed, approximately
ten times that imposed on an ordinary bar, created a sharp discrimination,
the court held the statute to be "flagrant preferment through omission, of
establishments basically similar to appellants."
Cassady v. Consolidated Naval Stores Co.8 involved a statute pro-
viding for separate taxation of mineral rights when owned in fee simple
separately from the ownership of the surface. It provided that if a return
were not made by the owner of subsurface rights, a duty was imposed upon
the tax assessor to assess such rights. But this separate assessment was
required only when an owner of some record interest in the land filed a
written request for it. The court held that the "effect of the Statute is to
authorize the tax assessor to . . . systematically and intentionally omit
from the tax rolls property of the same classifications as plaintiff's."37 Such
an omission by the assessing officer operated as a denial of equal protection
of the law. 8
A recent tax assessment case in which a denial of equal protection was
33. Volusia County Kennel Club v. Haggard, 73 So.2d 884, 898-899 (Fla. 1954). "These
two sections are 'kindred provisions.'" State v. City of Pensacola, 126 So.2d 566, 569 (Fla.
1961).
34. 121 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1960).
35. FLA. STAT. § 561.34(13) (1959).
36. 119 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1960).
37. Id. at 37.
38. The court first found the statute to be an invalid delegation of the legislative power,
and then noted that the exercise of that delegated power by the assessor would constitute
a denial of equal protection.
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pleaded was Lanier v. Overstreet.9 Owners of agricultural lands sought to
invalidate and set aside assessment of their lands by the county tax
assessor. They contended that the assessor failed to comply with section
193.11(3) of the Florida Statutes which provides, inter alia, that:
(3) All lands being used for agricultural purposes shall be
assessed as agricultural lands upon an acreage basis, regardless
of the fact that any or all of said lands are embraced in a plat of
a subdivision or other real estate development....
In arriving at his evaluation, the assessor considered other potential uses
besides the land's actual use for agriculture. The court noted that, "[a] s
in the case of other legislative classifications, if a legislative directive de-
signed to secure a just valuation of a particular class of taxable property
is reasonable, not arbitrary or unjustly discriminatory, and applicable
alike to all similarly situated, it should be upheld by the courts."4 The
statute was valid as a classification designed to secure a just valuation of
agricultural lands.4 ' The discrimination, implicit in the statute, against
non-agricultural lands did not alarm the court.
A 1955 statute42 grants to all dog tracks a credit of one hundred
seventy dollars per race, per day to cover their daily initial expense of
operation; this amount is deducted by each track from the seventeen per
cent of the pari-mutuel pools withheld by the track, and is to be deducted
before any taxes are imposed on the track.4 3 In a 1965 case appellants
asserted that the deduction was capricious and arbitrary and discriminated
against them and other taxpayers generally who are not allowed similar
credit out of taxes imposed upon them. The court validated the statute
since the only requirement of equality recognized was that there be no
arbitrary and judicially unreasonable discrimination among the class, that
is among the dog track operators.44
V. ZONING
The general principles applicable to the consideration of a zoning
ordinance's validity under equal protection are twofold. First, the classi-
39. 175 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1965). At issue were both the federal equal protection clause
and FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, providing for a "uniform and equal rate of taxation." See also
Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
40. 175 So.2d 521, 523 (1965).
41. The statute was held valid under FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, since the court found
a legislative intent, consistent with other directives to assess property according to the
land's actual character during the tax year.
42. FLA. STAT. § 550.162 (1965).
43. It is-to be noted that excise taxes are treated differently than property taxes.
Exemptions in excise tax statutes which ordinarily are classifications specifying
the nature and extent of imposition of the excise tax are not subject to the limitations
of uniformity and equality or restricted to the exemption purposes applying to the
taxation of real and personal property. Willis v. Morgan, 176 So.2d 73, 75 (Fla.
1965).
44. Willis v. Morgan, 176 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1965).
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fication must be related to the health, safety, general welfare or morals of
the public; second, the court utilizes a presumption of legislative validity
disguised as the "fairly debatable" test. Under this test, an ordinance will
be upheld if the court finds its necessity and reasonableness fairly de-
batable.45 Recent decisions indicate, however, that this presumption has
been at least severely limited, if not obviated.46
An excellent example of an equal protection problem encountered in
zoning occurred in Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota.4 T Sarasota, motivated
by aesthetics, enacted an ordinance limiting the size of signs in business
and industrial districts. Signs were classified as "point of sale" and "non-
point of sale."
The court construed the ordinance so that "at the point of sale the
wall sign could be of any size desired, but all other signs could be but 180
square feet, while at another place a wall sign could be only 300 square
feet and roof and other signs only 180 square feet."4 In the opinion of the
court, such a classification was not designed to preserve the city's beauty
in support of the legislature's alleged aesthetic purpose. Two reasons were
advanced. First, the court thought it unreasonable that a wall sign of
three hundred square feet at point of sale would be any more aesthetically
pleasing than one of the same size on a billboard. Additionally, the lan-
guage of the ordinance was construed to permit signs of unlimited periph-
eral measurement within the square footage limitations.4
45. Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Burk, 114 So.2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959). Despite
a great deal of testimony as to the wisdom of the ordinance, the court held that the fairly
debatable rule required validation. Recent cases, however, indicate that the fairly debatable
rule has gone the way of the general presumption of legislative validity.
46. In Burritt v. Harris, 172 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1965), the supreme court overruled a dis-
trict court determination that the zoning ordinance was fairly debatable. In effect, the
reasonableness of the ordinance was treated de novo. The importance of this decision was
underlined by the Second District Court of Appeal in Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174
So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). In discussing the Burritt decision the district court said
that,
[Bly this holding the Supreme Court had created an innovation in the zoning law
of Florida by casting on the zoning authority the burden of establishing by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that the zoning restrictions under attack "bear substantially
on the public health, morals, safety or welfare of the community."
In effect, the presumption of validity has become one of invalidity. For a more thorough
analysis of this matter see Harris, Zoning in Florida, 20 U. MIAMi L. REV. 195 (1966).
47. 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
48. Id. at 614.
49. The City of Sarasota amended its ordinance, still providing for the classification of
"point of sale" and "non-point of sale." Both classes were limited in size to one hundred
and eighty square feet, but "non-point of sale" signs were required to be at least twenty-
five feet from any other of the same type, except for "V-type" signs. In City of Sarasota v.
Sunad, Inc., 181 So.2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), the district court invalidated the amended
ordinance. The reasons advanced were these: there was no prohibition of grouping of "point-
of sale" signs as there was for "non-point of sale," and there still was no peripheral
measurement limitation, which would allow "skeletonized" signs so long as the total area
of the lettering did not exceed 180 square feet.
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VI. RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS
In this area Florida's equal protection inhibition is clearly subordi-
nate to the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. Rarely, if
ever, is a decision based on Florida's constitutional clause. There are good
reasons for this. In contrast to the actions of the United States Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Educ.,5° Shelley v. Kraemer,"' and other
decisions,52 which have given tremendous vitality to the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Florida Supreme Court has declined to extend the application
of section 1 of the Declaration of Rights into areas of racial or religious
discrimination. At best, the Florida Supreme Court could be described as
slow to recognize the range of fourteenth amendment protection; at worst,
the court might be suspected of foot-dragging. 3
Conversely, the vigor of the fourteenth amendment removes much of
the motivation to seek a remedy under Florida's clause. After all, if a
case can be won on the basis of the federal clause, there is little reason to
plead Florida equal protection, and additionally, little prospect of success.
With a few exceptions this article has dealt with Florida decisions
construing Florida's equal protection provision. In order, however, to
present a picture of Florida courts' treatment of equal protection in racial
and religious cases, it will be necessary to resort to decisions in which the
federal clause was pleaded and construed.
A series of cases in which both equal protection clauses were pleaded
commenced with State v. Mayo.54 Petitioner there argued that the death
penalty imposed on him was discriminatory since that penalty had been
meted out, to those in his age group, only to members of his race. As evi-
dence of this discrimination he cited statistics showing that in twelve years,
seven non-whites (in the fifteen to nineteen year age group) and no white
youths were executed. Petitioner asserted that the statute requiring the
death penalty, absent an affirmative recommendation of mercy by the
jury, was at fault and should be declared unconstitutional. The court
rejected this assertion, finding the evidence to be inconclusive.
This argument was again rejected in Thomas v. State,5" in which
petitioner demonstrated that in a twenty year period twenty-three negroes
were executed for rape, but only one white was executed.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), modified, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
51. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52. E.g., Evans v. Newton, 86 S. Ct. 486 (1966).
53. For example, consider the many cases in which a negro sought entrance to the
University of Florida College of Law. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 10 MIAMI
L.Q. 143 (1956), and 12 U. MIAMI L. REv. 288 (1958).
54. 87 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1956).
55. 92 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1957).
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Most recently, in Williams v. State,5" the appellant presented evi-
dence that since 1925 thirty-three negroes had received the death penalty
in rape cases. Again the argument was rejected, and ihis time the court
pointed out that appellant failed to indicate how many had been tried for
the crime.
In an allied case, the court rejected a contention that systematic
exclusion of negroes from the grand jury that indicted an appellant de-
prived him of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.5 7 Evi-
dence that 10.8 percent of the registered voters were negro, while only
1.2 percent of the list from which grand jury members were chosen were
negro, was held to be inconclusive.
Perhaps the most illustrative case in this area is presented by
McLaughlin v. State.5 8 The statute in question provided:
Any negro man and white woman, or any white man and negro
woman, who are not married to each other, who shall habitually
live in and occupy in the nighttime the same room shall each be
punished by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or by
fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.5"
The defendants, a negro man and a white woman, were convicted under
this statute. They argued a denial of equal protection of the laws because
first, the statute was a specific proscription of cohabitation solely for
persons of different races, and second, higher penalties were imposed on
persons of different races under this statute than were imposed under the
general fornication statute for the same act. The Florida Supreme Court
hqld that the statute did not violate the equal protection clauses. Based on
the authority of Pace v. Alabama,0° the court held the statute constitu-
tional since " 'punishment of each offending person, whether white or
black, is the same.' ,,61
Typically, this decision was reversed when it went to the United
States Supreme Court. There it was noted that "Pace represents a limited
view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in
the subsequent decisions of this Court." 2
Florida's consideration of those cases dealing with religious, rather
than racial, discrimination reveals a somewhat different approach.
56. 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
57. Porter v. State, 160 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1963).
58. 153 So.2d I (Fla. 1963).
59. Although there, is no comparable statute prohibiting cohabitation of persons of the
same race, FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1965) lists imprisonment not exceeding three months or a
fine of not more than thirty dollars for fornication by a "man" with a "woman."
60. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
61. McLaughlin v. State, supra note 58, at 2 quoting from Pace v. Alabama, supra
note 60, at 585.
62. McLaughlinv. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964).
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EQUAL PROTECTION
MacGregor v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n" considered a proceeding
to discipline a real estate broker for selling to a Jewish person property
listed with him subject to the restriction that it should be sold only to a
Christian. Further, it was alleged that the broker had represented to the
vendor that the purchaser was in fact a Christian. Appellant contended
that, under Shelley v. Kraemer,64 such a listing contract was unenforceable
-that such enforcement would constitute state action within the purview
of the fourteenth amendment. This argument was avoided since the court
interpreted the proceedings, not as enforcement of a discriminatory agree-
ment, but as a disciplining of a breach of faith.65
Along similar lines was a case involving restrictive covenants affect-
ing the sale and occupancy of a lot in a subdivision.66 These covenants
provided that no lot should be sold to or occupied by one not a member of
the property owner's association. 7 When defendants purchased, the by-
laws of the corporation provided that no member could sell or lease to a
non-white or a non-Christian. Additionally, the by-laws provided that an
owner or lessee of property within the subdivision could be denied mem-
bership if he "is not a Gentile or is not of the Caucasian race or has been
convicted of a felony.
' 68
Defendant, a Jew, constructed an expensive home and assumed
occupancy. The corporation filed suit to compel him to vacate, alleging
that he was not a member of the corporation. Defendant argued that the
restriction requiring membership in the corporation, together with the by-
laws requiring a member to be a Caucasian or Gentile, denied him the
equal protection of the law.
The Florida Supreme Court held that the restrictive covenant had the
effect of prohibiting purchase or occupancy by a Jew. Finding Shelley v.
Kraemer" applicable, the court believed that enforcing the restrictive
covenant would amount to state action under the fourteenth amendment.
70
Together, the Harris and MacGregor cases seem to define the extent
63. 99 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1958).
64. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
65. "Enforcement of a perhaps discriminatory contract is one thing; punishment of ad-
mitted breach of trust, bad faith, deception, and infidelity to his known duty is quite
another." McGregor v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So.2d 709, 712 (Fla. 1958).
66. Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc., 116 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1959).
67. These included:
2. Ownership. No lot .. . shall be sold . . . to any one not a member in good
standing of Sunset Islands Property Owners. ...
3. Occupancy. No lot . .. shall be used or occupied by anyone not a member
in good standing of Sunset Island Property Owners, Inc. Id. at 623.
68. Ibid.
69. Supra note 64.
70. The court specifically noted that it was not characterizing either the requirement of
membership in the corporation, or the limitation on membership of people of good moral
character as a prohibited restraint on alienation. In another setting such a requirement might
be entirely legitimate.
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to which the Florida Supreme Court accepts the decision in Shelley v.
Kraemer.
One Florida statute7' provides that, while jurors are to be taken
from male and female electors, no female's name shall be taken for jury
service unless she has registered her desire to be placed on the jury list
with the county clerk. Appellant, a woman, was convicted of second-degree
murder by an all male jury. She contended that the statute by imposing
upon women the burden of an affirmative registration which had not been
imposed upon men, deprived appellant of equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment. The court found no such deprivation,
reasoning that the requirement of voluntary registration was based on
reasonable rationale. Notwithstanding the equal protection limitation, the
Florida legislature could adopt a jury duty policy which recognized a
benefit in keeping women at home.72
71. FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1965) Qualifications and disqualifications of juror.
(1) Grand and petit jurors shall be taken from the male and female persons over
the age of twenty-one years, who are citizens of this state, and who have resided in
the state for one year and in their respective counties for six months, and who are
duly qualified electors of their respective counties; provided, however, that the name
of no female person shall be taken for jury service unless such person has registered
with the clerk of the circuit court her desire to be placed on the jury list.
72. Hoyt v. State, 119 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1959), aff'd, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
